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Solving the Pitfalls of Impartiality When
Arbitrating in China: How the Lessons of
the Soviet Union and Iran Can Provide




In December 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) admitted
China after almost fifteen years of negotiations.1 With the dramatic
decrease in tariff rates for WTO nations 2 came an equally impressive
increase in foreign investment into China.3 Logically, this influx of
investment into China also resulted in a greater number of legal disputes
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2006; B.A., Davidson College, 2003.
1. WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China's Accession (Press Release),
WTO News (Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
pres0le/pr252_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). As part of its acceptance into the
WTO, China agreed to: (1) provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO Members.
All foreign individuals and enterprises, including those not invested or registered in
China, will be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to enterprises in
China with respect to the right to trade; (2) eliminate dual pricing practices as well as
differences in treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in comparison to
those produced for export; (3) discontinue the use of price controls for use of protecting
domestic industries; (4) implement WTO agreement in an effective and uniform manner
by revising its existing domestic laws and enacting new legislation fully in compliance
with the WTO agreement; (5) within three years of accession, give all enterprises the
right to import and export all goods and trade them throughout the customs territory with
limited exceptions; (6) not introduce or maintain any export subsidies on agriculture. Id.
2. James C. Hsiung, The Aftermath of China's Accession the World Trade
Organization, 1 IND. INST. IND. REV. 8, 88 (June 22, 2003).
3. See GALE GROUP, INC. 2003 EUROMONEY INSTITUIONAL INVESTOR PLC, China
Law & Practice No. 3 Vol. 17 (Apr. 1, 2003) (chronicling the increased investment in
China by foreign companies, as well as listing the firms representing these ventures). See
also Gregory C. Chow, The Impact of Joining the WTO on China's Economic, Legal and
Political Institutions, Invited Speech delivered at the International Conference on Greater
China and the WTO (Mar. 22-24, 2001).
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between Chinese and U.S. parties.4 Unlike most multi-national disputes,
the disparities between Chinese and U.S. parties have become more
difficult to solve due to the diametrically opposed political and social
frameworks of the two countries. Yet, because the U.S. previously has
dealt with similar problems during the 1980s with Iran 5 and the Soviet
Union,6 the lessons of the not-so-distant past should help provide
solutions to the Sino-American problems of today.
Corporate parties from different nations primarily use arbitration to
resolve their legal disputes.7 These parties tend to seek arbitration in
order to prevent an abundance of jurisdictional problems. 8 Arbitration
alleviates such problems by providing an efficient form of dispute
resolution designed by the parties or an arbitral institution. 9  The
diametrically opposed legal traditions of the two nations only serve to
magnify these jurisdictional problems. As a result, arbitration presents
the only viable method of resolving disputes between politically polar
opposite nations.
In order to guarantee the legitimacy of the arbitration process, the
arbitral institution must ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator.' ° While
this proposition may seem self evident, in practice the process can be
more daunting. First, parties, at least in the short run, would benefit from
favorably partial arbitrators. Second, since nations fall predominantly
into either eastern or western political traditions, parties may find it
4. See GALE GROUP, INC. 2003 EUROMONEY INSTITUIONAL INVESTOR PLC,
International Financial Law Review No. 9 Vol. 20 (Sept. 1, 2001).
5. In response to the U.S.'s freezing of assets after the Iran Hostage Crisis, the U.S.
and Iran formed the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal in The Hague and commenced arbitral
proceedings on July, 1, 1981. General information on the U.S.-Iran Claims tribunal is
available at http://www.iusct.org/background-english.html (last visited Jan..24, 2006).
6. See W. Michael Reisman, For a Permanent U.S.-Soviet Claims Commission, 83
A.J.I.L. 51, 53 (Jan. 1989). At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in November 1986,
Mikael Gorbachev introduced perestroika, a social, economic and political restructuring
of the Soviet Union, which opened the Soviet Union up to greater Western influence. Id.
More background on perestroika is available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/
pere.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2005).
7. Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of Arbitration in Resolving
Transnational Disputes: A Survey of Trends in the PRC, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329,
333 (1997); see generally James H. Carter, Litigating in Foreign Territory: Arbitration
Alternatives and Enforcement Issues, Presentation Before the American Bar Association
Center for Continuing Legal Education, National Institute, Doing Business Worldwide
(Feb. 8-10, 1998). In discussing why arbitration is so popular in foreign litigation, the
author make multiple assertions including: 1) resulting awards have little risk of being set
aside by courts; 2) arbitration awards are easier to enforce than court awards; 3) there is
increased privacy; 4) the desire for predictability and avoidance of a potentially hostile
foreign court is the largest incentive for choice of arbitration. Id.
8. See Brown & Rogers, supra note 7, at 333.
9. See Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2001).
10. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 92 (R.I. 1991).
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challenging to find an arbitrator that can fairly balance an issue decided
along geopolitical lines. Finally, intrinsically, both nations distrust each
other, making even the selection of an arbitral institution problematic."
Yet, even with these problems, the U.S. has managed to successfully
resolve disputes with these diametrically opposed nations through the use
of arbitration.'2 Furthermore, the opportunity to repeat, and even surpass
such successes with China seems much more attainable because the U.S.
has a more amiable relationship with China than it did with either Iran or
the Soviet Union during the 1980s. 13  While the task of ensuring
arbitrator neutrality in China, both in perception and reality, presents a
number of possible barriers, 14 the reward of minimizing the risk of
western nations doing business in China offers a result conducive to
expanding the global economy into a relatively untapped region with a
huge productive potential. 5
Part II provides background of arbitrator neutrality in the U.S. and
abroad, as well as discusses its specific importance in corporate and
commercial transactions on the international level. Part III examines
how arbitration fits within the legal culture of China and illuminates the
problems with arbitration in China from a western perspective. To better
understand the problems in ensuring arbitrator neutrality in China, Part
IV discusses the historical problems and successes that the U.S. had in
ensuring neutral arbitrators with Iran and the Soviet Union during the
Iran-U.S. Claims Trials and perestroika, respectively. Part V compares
and contrasts the problems the U.S. had with Iran and the Soviet Union
to the problems the U.S. currently has with China with respect to
ensuring arbitrator neutrality. In so doing, Part V demonstrates how
certain solutions used in the past may offer possible solutions in China.
Finally, Part VI draws basic conclusions from the analysis.
11. See, e.g., Jerome Cohen, Seminar on Private Equity Investing in Emerging
Markets at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Center for
International Business and Public Policy of Johns Hopkins University (Oct. 23, 2001),
available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/centers/bizgovcenter/seminars/oct_01text.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). In his speech, Mr. Cohen comments on the procedural unfairness
to western parties using CIETAC arbitration. Id.
12. See Richard A. Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International
Arbitration: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 253, 253-270 (1988) (explaining the success of the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal); see
also Edwin R. Alley, International Arbitration: The Alternative of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, 22 INT'L LAW 837, notes 1-45 (1988) (for evidence of success
with East-West disputes in the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce).
13. Compare Part III infra (detailing in part the current relationship between the
United States and China) with Part IV infra (detailing in part the relationship the United
States had with Iran and the Soviet Union during the 1980s).
14. See Part III & Part V infra.
15. See U.S. Firms Make Profits in China, Global News Wire-Asia Africa
Intelligence Wire: Business Dailey Update (Oct. 8, 2004).
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II. Arbitrator Neutrality
Foreign parties often cite arbitration's perceived independence and
impartiality as the main reason why they choose arbitration as their
preferred method of dispute resolution. 16 This impartiality begins and
ends with the arbitrator or arbitrators deciding the case. Sophisticated
commercial and corporate parties voluntarily contract into arbitration to
resolve disputes that arise between them. 17 As a result, once arbitrators
lose the appearance of impartiality, regardless whether founded on
reality, corporate entities shy away from using arbitrators to resolve their
disputes, ultimately leading to a chilling effect on commerce between
nations. 18
This part first discusses the grounds for ensuring arbitrator
neutrality in the United States, focusing on Section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act.19  Next, it examines the importance of arbitrator
neutrality in international arbitrations. Specifically, it analyzes the
advantages of arbitration over the courts internationally, the advantages
and disadvantages of the different structures of arbitral tribunals, and the
residual effects of impartiality in international arbitrations.
A. Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act
Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides the only
statutory means to vacate an arbitration award in the United States."0
While the purpose of ensuring arbitrator neutrality emanates throughout
Section 10, the most applicable sub-section of the statute specifically
focuses on "evident partiality or corruption" of the arbitrator.21 In the
16. Jose Rosell, Arbitral Proceedings--Selected Issues: The Challenge of
Arbitrators, 10 CROAT. ARBIT. YEARB. 151, 151(2003).
17. Olga K. Byrne, A New Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: The
Neutrality of Party Appointed Arbitrators on a Tripartite Panel, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1815, 1817 (Sept. 2003).
18. If parties lose faith in arbitration, one of two results could occur. First,
international commercial parties could attempt to use the court systems when conflicts
arise. Going through the court systems often leads to litigation in multiple countries
because each party would rather litigate in its home nation or at least a nation whose laws
favor their claim. See, e.g., Paramedics Electomedicina Comercial, LTDA. v. GE
Medical Sys. Infor. Tech., Inc., 369 F.3d 645 (2nd Cir. 2004) (where both a Brazilian and
American party brought suit in their respective countries when a dispute over arbitration
arose). This result would also draw out the cost of litigation for both parties. See, e.g.
Remmey v. Paine Webber, 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994). Second, foreign parties
could simply stop doing business in a country where they believe arbitrators do not act
impartially because they believe the risk of doing business in a country without an
effective system of dispute resolution outweighs the possible benefits.
19. See infra Part II.A
20. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004).
21. Id.
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landmark case Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co.,22 the U.S. Supreme Court vacated an arbitral award on this ground
because the neutral arbitrator failed to disclose a continued business
relationship, which included consulting with the prevailing party on the
dispute in question. 3 The Court found that the neutral arbitrator not only
"must be unbiased, but also must avoid the appearance of bias. 24 The
Ninth Circuit elaborated on this holding in Schmitz v. Zilvet,25 reasoning
that a rule requiring arbitrators to disclose any possible bias to the parties
at the outset of the arbitration prevents disgruntled parties from
attempting to vacate the award after the arbitrator renders his decision. 6
Conversely, a substantial line of cases has rejected the stringent standard
set out in Commonwealth Coatings in favor of an objective approach
asking whether a "reasonable person" would believe the situation
provides "strong evidence of partiality. 27 This view falls in line with the
federal policy favoring arbitration. 8  Likewise, some judges have
22. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968).
23. Id. Commonwealth Coatings addressed the neutrality of the third party neutral
arbitrator of a three-man arbitration tribunal. Id.
24. Id.
25. Schmitz v. Zilvet, 20 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).
26. Id. Many federal and state courts have followed the standard set out in
Commonwealth Coatings. See, e.g., Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197,
1200 (11 th Cir. 1982) (adopting "reasonable impression of possible bias" standard and
holding that arbitrator had a duty to disclose his involvment in an ongoing legal dispute
with an insurer party); Olson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 51 F.3d 157,
159-60 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that disclosure of "indirect ties" will aid the
arbitration process and holding that arbitrator had a duty to disclose business relationship
between his firm and the party); A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (recognizing arbitrator's duty to disclose facts which "might create an impression
of possible bias"); Barcon Assoc. v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 220 (N.J.
1981) (adopting "appearance of partiality" standard and holding that arbitrator had a duty
to disclose business relationship with the party); Kern v. 303 E. 57th St. Corp., 204
A.D.2d 152, 152-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (implementing an "appearance of partiality"
standard and holding that arbitrator had duty to disclose that party's attorney had referred
business to him during arbitration proceedings).
27. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit
Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984). This court treated the opinion in Commonwealth
Coating as a plurality, even though Justices White and Marshall completely joined
Justice Black's opinion. Id. at 82. Many other federal and state courts have followed the
standard set out in Morelite. See, e.g., Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental Life Ins.
Co., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344,
1358 (6th Cir. 1989); Local 530, AFSCME, Council 15 v. City of New Haven, 518 A.2d
941, 949 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986) (adopting the Morelite standard and holding that a
arbitrator did not show "evident partiality" in a labor grievance from a police officer
because a mayor had appointed him to public office); In re Arbitration Between U.S.
Turney Exploration, Inc. and PSI, Inc., 577 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(adopting a Morelite standard and holding a arbitrator's advice to a party regarding
presentation of evidence was not "evident partiality").
28. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983). To develop a standard, some courts such as ANR Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C.,
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attributed the recent cooling of the Commonwealth Coatings standard
mainly to its inapplicability in the modem business world.2 9
While a recent Texas Supreme Court decision followed the standard
set out in Commonwealth Coating, it noted that the duty of disclosure
does not extend to party-appointed arbitrators. 30 This assertion seems to
violate Section 10(a)(2) of the FAA, which calls for a court to vacate an
arbitral award if evident partiality occurs in the "arbitrators, or either of
them. 31  However, some jurisdictions, both federal and state, have to
some extent lessened the standard of partiality for party-appointed
arbitrators.32 These courts assert that not only is it unrealistic to believe
that non-neutral arbitrators will refrain from advocating for the party that
appointed them, but also that the parties themselves had contracted for a
party-appointed arbitrator to ensure the tribunal understood their
interests.33 However, some of these jurisdictions have made a point to
state that they nevertheless require arbitrators to "participate in the
arbitration process in a fair, honest[,] and good faith manner.,
34
Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999), have developed a set of four guidelines to serve as a
framework for evaluating these type of claims. Under the guidelines, the courts should
evaluate: (1) the extent and character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of
the arbitrator in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship between the
arbitrator and the party he is alleged to favor; (3) the connection of that relationship to the
arbitration; and (4) the proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration
proceeding. Id. at 500.
29. See JCI Comm., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 103, 324 F.3d 42, 51
(1st Cir. 2003) (finding the fact that business rivals of one of the arbitrating parties sat on
the arbitration tribunal did not constitute evident partiality because the litigants were on
notice that the tribunal would consist of members of its industry). See also Sphere Drake
Ins., Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 621-23 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that a
party-appointed arbitrator need not be disqualified simply because he served as counsel
for the party in an unrelated insurance matter that occurred four years earlier).
30. Burlington N.R.R. v. TUCO, 960 S.W.2d 629, 639 (Tex. 1997).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2004).
32. See Daiichi Haw. Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 103 Haw. 325, 342 (Haw. 2003)
(assuming that party-appointed arbitrators "might view the proceeding through a more
subjective and partial lens than a neutral arbitrator"). See also Washburn v. McManus,
895 F.Supp 392, 399 (D. Conn. 1994) ("Courts have commented that some
subjectiveness is tolerated and even expected"); Astoria Med. Group v. Health Ins. Plan
of Greater New York, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 135 (N.Y. 1962) ("The very reason each of the
parties contracts for the choice of his own arbitrator is to make certain that his 'side' will,
in a sense, be represented on the tribunal"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d
88, 92 (R.I. 1991) ("It would be inappropriate to require the party-appointed arbitrator to
adhere to the same standard of neutrality as a judge. That standard ignores the practical
realities of arbitration panels composed of party-appointed arbitrators."); Sphere Drake
Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating "failure [for
a party-appointed arbitrator] to make a full disclosure may sully his reputation for candor
but does not demonstrate 'evident partiality' and thus does not spoil the award").
33. See Rosell, 10 CROAT. ARBIT. YEARB. 151, 155 (2003).
34. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 885,
892 (D. Conn. 1991). The court recognized the distinction between neutral and non-
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Conversely, other jurisdictions, 35 as well as arbitral institutions like the
American Arbitration Association36  (AAA), have supported the
proposition that all arbitrators, whether party-appointed or neutral, have
the same obligation of impartiality. Generally, these jurisdictions believe
that any impartiality by arbitrators damages the integrity of arbitration as
a whole.37 Ultimately, the vast majority of international jurisdictions
adhere to this legal tradition,38 making the idea of a non-neutral arbitrator
a unique aspect of American arbitration law.39
B. Arbitrator Neutrality in International Arbitration
As previously stated, parties from different nations prefer to use
arbitration as a means to resolve their legal disputes.4 ° Arbitration
provides international parties with specific advantages over traditional
litigation. Foremost, arbitration alleviates most of the jurisdictional
disputes amongst parties.41 Rather than litigate in the national courts of
one of the parties to a dispute, arbitration provides a neutral venue that
aims at ensuring procedural fairness for both parties. 42  Specifically,
parties can contract to govern all disputes by a certain set of laws or
neutral parties for disclosure, yet still found that a non-neutral arbitrator's failure to
disclose inter alia his ex-parte communication with the appointing party regarding the
merits of the case constituted a violation of AAA rules. Id.
35. See, e.g., Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-county Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 220
(N.J. 1981) (finding that the "idea of biased or partisan arbitrators is conceptually
inadmissible, and the law simply cannot allow any judicially enforceable arbitration
proceeding to be anything other than an impartial proceeding which has appropriate
appearances of impartiality"); Northwest Mech., Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n of City of
Va., 283 N.W.2d. 522, 524 (Minn. 1979) (applying disclosure requirement to both a
party-designated arbitrator and neutral arbitrator); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Rytex
Corp., 312 N.E.2d 466, 468-469 (N.Y. 1974) (applying the disclosure requirement to all
arbitrators).
36. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (effective Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
37. See Barcon Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-county Asphalt Corp., 430 A.2d 214, 220 (N.J.
1981).
38. See Richard M. Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitration: The Experience
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 253, 260 (1988); see also
Thomas E. Carbonneau, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 335, 413-14 (2004).
The Swiss Supreme Court's ruling that party-appointed arbitrators must be independent
in relation to both the parties' and the parties' lawyers. Hitachi Ltd. v. SMS Schloemann,
15 ASA Bull. 99-107 (Swiss Sup. Ct. 1994); see also supra note 36.
39. See supra note 32 (listing the jurisdictions that adhere to this different standard);
see also Carbonneau, supra note 38, at 413-14.
40. See Rosell supra note 16, at 151; Byrne, supra note 17, at 1817.
41. See Thomas Lundmark, Verbose Contracts, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 131 (Winter
2001).
42. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
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procedures. 43 For example, a party from country X can contract with a
party from country Y to have the contract laws of country Z govern any
disputes between them, yet still provide for certain procedural aspects of
the arbitration such as the language the arbitrators must speak. Not only
does this aspect of arbitration help to ensure parties receive a
procedurally fair arbitration, but it also gives them an increased level of
substantive predictability for their disputes. Both these aspects of
arbitration help to lower the risk of commercial parties doing business in
foreign countries.44 Furthermore, due to the universal acceptance of the
1958 New York Convention,45 parties cannot resolve their disputes in
multiple forums if one party contests the decision of the arbitral tribunal
because the convention provides for the confirmation of arbitration
awards in member nations.46
Arbitration also provides commercial parties with advantages not
found in litigation. First, it offers them an efficient and generally cost-
effective solution to their legal disputes.47 The arbitration process,
especially the "fast-track variety,' 4 8 expedites the arbitration process.
Furthermore, the lack of an appeals process in arbitration, gives parties
expedited finality in their legal disputes.49  Although arbitration can
43. Id. at 518.
44. See Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope and Autonomy in International
Contracts and its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L LAW 595, 633-35 (2001) (commenting on how the choice of law increases
predictability, allowing parties to know and adhere to the legal standards before a legal
dispute arises); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International
Arbitration Awards: An Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451, 453 (2000)
(commenting on how arbitration in international disputes helps to avoid "hometown
justice").
45. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention or Convention].
46. Id. Article V of the convention provides the limited reasons why parties to the
convention should not confirm an arbitration award. Id. Currently, 134 nations are party
to the convention. The list of nations is available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/ny-
convention/parties.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
47. See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Symposium on Business Dispute Resolution: ADR
and Beyond: Mainstreaming: Systematic Corporate Use of ADR, 59 ALB. L. REv. 847,
853-54 (1996).
48. Fast-track arbitration is an accelerated form of arbitration contracted into by
parties to achieve finality. The SCC Institute has recently changed the name of this form
of arbitration from "fast track arbitration" to "expedited arbitration." See
http://www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/regler/web -A4 Forenklade_.2004_.eng.
pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). This form of arbitration increases the benefits of cost-
effectiveness and finality, while at the same time limits aspects of procedural due
process. Id.
49. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2004) (limiting judicial review of arbitration awards to a few
very narrow situations); see also Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (narrowly restricting the
situations where a member nation may not confirm an arbitration award).
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contain a substantial level of front-end costs, 50 ultimately, the decreased
lawyers' fees, combined with opportunity costs associated with litigation,
generally make arbitration more cost-effective for commercial parties
than litigation. 51
Second, arbitration allows parties to maintain privacy in resolving
their legal disputes.5  Generally, parties that solve their disputes through
litigation must make certain records public.53 Arbitration helps to curtail
the possibility of damage to a party's reputation from any public
litigation.54 As a result, commercial parties value the anonymity that
arbitration offers.55 Such privacy virtually eliminates the risk of the
public learning of the party's "dirty laundry."
Finally, arbitration provides commercial parties with an expert
decision maker.5 6 Presumably, the arbitrator has a background in the
subject area of the dispute. 57  Judges or juries resolving the dispute
through public litigation usually do not have the same level of
expertise.58 Consequently, by contracting for an arbitrator with specific
knowledge in the field of the dispute, parties hope to eliminate much of
the unpredictability associated with litigation.59
Arbitrator bias however, negates many of the benefits of arbitration
to commercial parties. Before a court can decide whether arbitrator
partiality occurred, it must first define what constitutes impartiality. As
stated above, different standards relevant to this question exist in the
50. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION,
Appendix B (effective as of Oct. 2004). Parties must pay on a sliding scale of arbitration
fees dependent on the sum in dispute. Id. The minimum fee for an arbitration of less
than $50,000 is $2,500. The entire scale is available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
court/english/arbitration/pdf documents/rules/rules-arb-english.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2006).
51. See Cronin-Harris, supra note 47, at 855-58 (relying on inter alia CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution, ADR Cost Savings & Benefits Studies 1-14 to 1-23 (CPR Model
ADR Procs. and Pracs. Series)) (Catherine Cronin-Harris ed., 1994) (discussing the
various costs associated with civil litigation).
52. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Ending Arbitration's Finality through
FunctionalAnalysis, 37 GA. L. R. 123, 157-60 (Fall 2002).
53. See William H. Knull, III and Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on
International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeals Option?, 11 AM. REv. INT'L
ARB. 531, 538-39 (2000).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 538-41.
56. See Byme, supra note 17, at 1818.
57. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983)
(stating that parties "prefer a tribunal knowledgeable about the subject matter of their
disputes to a generalist court with its austere impartiality but limited knowledge of
subject matter"); see also Letter from Roscoe Pound, Esq., Dean Emeritus of the Law
School of Harvard University (Feb. 11, 1953), 8 APR DiSP. RESOL. J. 1, 1 (1953),
reprinted in 56 APR DisP. RESOL. J. 45, 52 (2001).
58. See Knull and Rubins, supra note 53, at 540.
59. See Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983).
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United States.6 ° International jurisdictions tend to adhere to the stricter
standard for determining impartiality.6' Such a standard obviously has
its place in arbitrations using a single arbitrator. With the onus of the
entire decision-making process on one man's shoulders, a single
arbitrator should strive to maintain the same level of impartiality as a
judge.62 However, single-arbitrator arbitrations present some logistical
problems63 even though they cost less than three-man tribunals.
64
Consequently, international commercial arbitrations, especially those
cases involving large sums of money, gravitate towards the use of three-
arbitrator tribunals with each party appointing one arbitrator.65 As with a
single arbitrator, the third-party neutral arbitrator should maintain the
utmost of neutrality. Yet, although against the generally accepted
principles of most international jurisdictions, allowing for a different
standard of impartiality for party-appointed arbitrators may prove
beneficial in specific types of international arbitrations.
At the most, in all arbitrations the level of partiality amongst party-
appointed arbitrators must be minimal and uniform. The duty of
maintaining the appearance of procedural fairness remains a necessary
task, because in the end, the cost of arbitration is minimal compared to
the risk of impartiality.66 Ultimately, institutions can measure the
success of arbitration in the willingness of commercial parties to
voluntarily contract for its continual use. Without such a willingness to
use arbitration, international parties would have greater difficulty
resolving disputes in the ever expanding global economy.67  The
60. See supra Section II-B.
61. See supra note 38.
62. The operative word in this statement is "strive." Justice White commented on
this point in his concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings, finding that arbitrators should
not be held to the same standard as judges because their effectiveness as arbitrators
occurs as a result of their position in the marketplace. The key then becomes not their
prior business dealings, but rather their disclosure of these relationships to both parties
before the onset of the arbitration. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co.,
393 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
63. See Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 383, 399-402 (1999).
Arbitrations with single arbitrators run into the problem of how that arbitrator is chosen.
64. Id. For the most part, this statement is self-evident. Parties must pay three times
the amount for a tribunal made up of three arbitrators.
65. See Mosk, supra note 38, at 253.
66. See M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators, 9 J.
INT'L ARB. 31,31,37 (No. 4, 1992).
67. See Arbitration Sector to Play a Greater Role, BUSINESS DAILEY UPDATE,
GLOBAL NEWSWIRE-ASIA AFRICA INTELLIGENCE WIRE (May 17, 2004). This article
chronicles the increase of trade in China and how this causes more disputes, which have
generally been resolved through arbitration. Id. Conversely then, if parties do not feel
comfortable with arbitration because they feared impartiality of arbitrators, the disputes
will not reach a solution. Such a result increases the risk to foreign investors and
[Vol. 110:3
SOLVING THE PITFALLS OF IMPARTIALITY
increased risk and unpredictability would only lead to a cooling in
commerce between foreign nations.68 As a result, in order to maximize
the economic opportunities in foreign nations, countries and arbitral
institutions must first ensure the appearance of impartiality in their
arbitrators.
III. Arbitration in China
Arbitration has become the preferred method for foreign parties to
resolve their legal disputes in China, due in large part to the distrust these
parties have with the Chinese courts. 6 9  The Chinese government has
legislated that the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC) is charged with resolving all arbitrations in
China involving foreign parties.7 ° While this Commission has taken
steps to ensure the impartiality of its arbitrators,7' CIETAC rules
nevertheless contain major flaws that give it the appearance of partiality.
With the increasing number of disputes between U.S. and Chinese
parties,72 problems arising from this appearance of partiality only will be
magnified.
A. The Legal Culture in China
Unlike western nations, China has a unique legal culture predicated
consequently causes a cooling effect on the level of investment in that particular nation.
68. Id.
69. See Deborah Chow, Development of China's Legal System Will Strengthen Its
Mediation Programs, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFL. RESOL. 4 no. 131 (2002); see also
Michael T Colatrella, Jr., "Court Performed" Mediation in the People's Republic of
China: A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts'
Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. DisP. RESOL. 391, 395 (2000); but see generally Cole
Sternberg, Chinese Courts: More a Gamble than Arbitration?, 4 INT'L Bus. L. REV. 31
(2004) (stating that Chinese courts may be fairer than arbitration, a minority viewpoint).
70. See Li Hu, Setting Aside an Arbitral Award in the People's Republic of China,
12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 14-16 (2001); See also Xiaowen Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral
Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the United States and China, 11 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 607, 607-613, 624-628 (2000). While Chinese parties can contract to
arbitrate with a non-CIETAC arbitral institution, foreign arbitrations that take place in
China must be arbitrated through CIETAC. Id. For obvious reasons, Chinese parties
prefer to arbitrate in China and often have leverage to do so because foreign parties are
coming to China for business. See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory
Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards in the People's Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-
PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 12, *7-*8 (Jun. 2000). Furthermore, enforcing arbitral awards
issued by CIETAC is probably easier than those issued by other foreign arbitral
institutions. See generally id.
71. See Michael J. Moser, Arbitration in China, THE CHINA Bus. REV. 45 (Sept.-Oct.
1990); see also Yanmin Huang, The Ethics of Arbitrators in CIETAC Arbitrations, 12 J.
INT'L ARB. 5 (No. 2 1995).
72. See GALE GROUP, supra note 3.
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largely on family.73 This legal culture differs so much from western
legal cultures that western parties often feel that no predictable legal
culture even exists.7 4 Without taking this culture into account, western
parties will find it virtually impossible to conduct profitable and mutually
beneficial business dealings with Chinese parties.
1. Contracts
Foreign parties arbitrating in China need to first understand the
differences between Chinese and western contract law. Chinese parties
do not believe in a fmalized contract.75 Rather, they believe that a
contract merely begins a business relationship between the parties and
the parties must adapt their contract to meet the future business
relationship.76 This notion of a "living contract" obviously runs contrary
to western contract law. For foreign parties accustomed to
memorializing entire business relationships in their contracts, this
practice can lead to disputes based on this misunderstanding alone.77
Furthermore, from a western perspective, uncertainty with respect to a
contract only increases the risk for foreign corporate parties to enter into
joint ventures with their Chinese counterparts.78
2. Saving Face and Guanxi
To effectively negotiate with Chinese parties, western parties need
to appreciate the Chinese understanding of saving face and guanxi.
Saving face originates from a Confucian concept meaning "prestige" and
"personal character., 79 Chinese parties put a premium on maintaining
73. See Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599, 1608-09,
1634-38 (JUL. 2000). Law in China has always centered on the family rather than the
nation, although this has changed some under communist rule. Id. In fact, as Ruskola
argues, family or clan in China acts much like a corporation or trust. Id.
74. See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 184 (Oct. 2002)
(stating, "[u]nlike the more traditional comparativist who studies French or German law,
for example, the student of Chinese law frequently needs to convince her audience that
the subject matter exists in the first place.").
75. See Patricia Pattison and Daniel Herron, The Mountains are High and the
Emperor Is Far Away: Sanctity of Contract Law in China, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 459, 460
(Spring 2003). In recent years China has tried to assimilate its contract law to become
closer to western views. Id.
76. See BEE CHEN GOH, TRADE AND INVESTMENT NEGOTIATION WITH THE CHINESE IN
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT 40 (K C D M Wilde
ed., LBC Information Services 2000).
77. See Pattison and Herron, supra note 75, at 466-73.
78. Id.
79. See George 0. White III, Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct
Investment Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China, 5 TRANSACTIONS 55, 58
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their reputation, or "face," and quickly take offense to any implication
that attacks it. 80  Consequently, direct and confrontational behavior
inherent to western negotiations often has a detrimental effect upon
negotiations with Chinese parties.8'
Similarly, Chinese parties value the concept of "guanxi" in business
relationships. This concept establishes a "special relationship individuals
have with each other in which each can make unlimited demands on each
other., 82 Such a moral sense of obligation is foreign to western parties
and puts great importance on trust and patience.83 Accordingly, refusing
a request by a party will lead to a loss of "face" from the requesting
party.
84
These two concepts center on flexibility between parties. While
such a relationship fosters trust, it also leaves uncertainty typically not
found in western relations. As a result, the increased risk that western
parties may incur in this aspect of relations with Chinese parties
increases the importance of ensuring the impartiality of the arbitrators
deciding their disputes.
3. Communism
Foreign observers say that the Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand.
Why? Simply because our people have shown loyalty to family and
clan but not to the nation-there has been no nationalism.
85
-Sun Yat-sen
Sun Yat-sen spoke of a China before the rise of communism and
Mao Zedong.86 After 1949, communism introduced the new element of
nationalism into China's legal tradition. Unlike other communist
societies that believe in "[a]bolition of the family, '87 China's
communism became tiered with the family on the lower level and the
state as a national patriarchal presence. 88 However, even this view over-
(FALL 2003).
80. See Jeffery C.Y. Li, Strategic Negotiations in the Greater Chinese Economic
Area: A New American Perspective, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1035, 1060 (1996).
81. See White, supra note 79, at 58.
82. GOH, supra note 76, at 39-40.
83. See White, supra note 79, at 60-61.
84. See id. at 59.
85. Ruskola, supra note 73, at 1681.
86. See TIMEasia.com available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/
1999/990823/sun-yat-senl.html. (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
87. Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels Reader, 487
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1978).
88. See Ruskola, supra note 73, at 1699; see also Melanne Andromecca Civic, A
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simplifies the complex role communism plays in the modem China,
especially after the reform era, beginning in 1978.89
Although the communist structure may help western parties
understand the vast differences between western and Chinese societies,
nevertheless, communism greatly increases risk to international business
propositions in China.9° While in recent years the Chinese government
has opened its doors to increased foreign investment, 9' the instability of
the state-driven system leaves corporations at risk that the communist
government could seize their investment with little or no compensation.92
As a result, western parties not only must stay on good terms with their
direct business partners, but also convince the communist party that their
investment remains mutually beneficial. However, the situation does not
leave U.S. parties without any leverage in their dealings with China.
Ultimately, the recent U.S. investment in China has helped to propel the
often sluggish Chinese economy.93 Therefore, the Chinese government
has a vested interest in maintaining an appearance of procedural fairness
in handling disputes with U.S. investors.
B. Increased Interactions with the West
China's admission into the WTO in December 2001 was only the
latest in its attempts to westernize trade.94 On January 22, 1987, China
Comparative Analysis of International and Chinese Human Right's Law-Universality
versus Cultural Realism, 2 BuF. J. INT'L L. 285, 300-03 (Winter 1995-96). Mao tried hard
to alter China to meet his own view of communism standards with plans such as the
Cultural Revolution. While these plans worked to some extent, Mao could never
severely alter the strong family structure in China. Id.
89. See Sonia M. Kim, Old World Religious Persecution in a New World Setting:
How International Relationships Can Affect China's Treatment Towards It's Religious
People, 2 RUTGERS J. LAW & RELIG. 2, 4-10 (2000/2001); see also Ruskola, supra note
73, at 1687-88. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China gradually opened up to foreign
investors. This trend culminated in its entrance to the WTO in 2001. See supra note 1.
90. See infra, note 92 and accompanying text.
91. See Petrified Forest National Park Expansion Act and Resources Bill 2004:
Hearing on United States-China Economic Before the Committee on House Resources,
Subcommittee on National Parks, Recreation and Public Lands, 10 8th Cong. (2004)
(statement by Carolyn Bartholomew, Commissioner United States-China Economic).
92. Like in all countries that experienced a communist takeover, China nationalized
its corporate structure soon after Mao took power. See Ruskola, supra note 73, at 1687-
88. More troubling, however, are instances such as the Chinese government's eviction of
McDonald's from its prime location near Tiananmen Square, unilaterally rescinding a
twenty-year contract after only two years. See Tom Post and Steven Strasser, No Free
Lunches Here, NEWSWEEK 39 (Feb. 20, 1995).
93. China currently has a 15.5 billion dollar trade surplus with the United States.
See Jill Dutt, China Unlikely to Float Currency Soon, Officials Say, THE WASHINGTON
POST El (Nov. 13, 2004).
94. See WTO Ministerial Conference, supra note 1.
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became a signatory to the aforementioned 1958 New York Convention.95
China has consistently increased trade with western nations, especially
the United States in the past twenty-five years.96 The approximately 1.3
billion inhabitants of China present a virtually endless source of
economic potential for western businesses.97 Similarly, China has inched
its way towards a market economy aided greatly by joint ventures with
98western entities and special coastal economic zones.
C. CIETA C and Dispute Resolution in China
CIETAC handles virtually every foreign arbitration that takes place
in China.99 With the lack of competition mandated by the communist
government, CIETAC has a monopoly on dispute resolution in the
emerging super power. Consequently, as more western business comes
through China, the impartiality of CIETAC arbitrations holds an ever
increasing importance in maintaining good trade relations.
1. CIETAC History and Structure
China originally established a foreign commercial arbitral
institution in 1956.100 By 1980, the Chinese government had renamed
the institution the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC). °10  CIETAC's headquarters are located in
Beijing, but it has continued to open new offices in other parts of the
country to meet increased demand. 10 2 Since 1988, CIETAC has changed
its applicable rules six times, presumably to meet the ever changing
demands in the global community for impartiality and fairness in
95. See Convention on the Recognition of and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York, 1958) available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/
un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcement.convention.new.york. 1958/doc.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). This link does not provide the language of the convention itself
but rather the countries that have ratified and acceded to it.
96. See GALE GROUP, supra note 3.
97. See China.org.cn Facts and Figures available at http://www.china.org.cn/
english/en-sz2005/index.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
98. See Sarah Schafer and Wang Zhneru, A Welcome to Walmart, NEWSWEEK (Dec.
20, 2004) available at http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/Newsweek/2004/12/20/684459
(last visited Jan. 24, 2006). See also China Hopes for Activation of Trade and
Cooperation with CIS Countries, ECONOMIC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2004).
99. See Hu, supra note 70, at 14-16. See also Qiu, supra note 70, at 607-613, 624-
628.
100. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission official
website available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
101. Id.
102. Id. CIETAC has other offices in Dalian, Fuzhou, Changsta, Chongqui and
Chengdu. Id. It also maintains sub-commissions in Shanghai and Shenzen, which
basically are extensions of the Bejing office in terms of jurisdiction and arbitrators. Id.
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international arbitrations. 10 3  Since China's accession into the WTO,
CIETAC has become the world's busiest arbitral institution in terms of
case load and has arbitrated for parties of 45 countries other than
China. 104
Like most large arbitral institutions, CIETAC has an honorary
chairman, vice-president, and several board members.'0 5 Moreover, each
office or sub-commission has its own secretary.' 0 6 Generally, CIETAC
arbitrations take place before three-man arbitral panels.'0 7 In accordance
with most three-man panels, each party selects an arbitrator from a list of
acceptable CIETAC arbitrators, and the two party-appointed arbitrators
choose a third neutral arbitrator. 10 8 If the two party-appointed arbitrators
fail to agree on a third arbitrator, CIETAC administration appoints the
presiding arbitrator.
0 9
Parties select arbitrators for their specialty in the field of the
dispute.' 10 CIETAC provides broad guidelines to arbitrators to prevent
evident partiality. Article 25 of the CIETAC rules provides that an
arbitrator must disclose any circumstances which could cause justifiable
doubt of his partiality.' Similarly, any party who fears impartiality
concerns can submit a request to the arbitral commission for the
arbitrator's withdrawal, with the arbitral commission holding the
ultimate decision making power. 1
2
103. Id.
104. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission official
website available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). According to the
CIETAC website, CIETAC awards are "accepted as fair and impartial both at home and
abroad and are recognized and enforced in more than 140 countries and regions." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 24 available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). Parties can choose a sole arbitrator, but it rarely occurs. In China,
parties can also not partake in ad-hoc arbitration. See Hu, supra note 70.
108. Id. CIETAC's pool of arbitrators is roughly two-thirds Chinese nationals and
one-third foreign nationals.
109. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 24 available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006).
110. China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission official
website available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). CIETAC also
promotes conciliation between the parties, if both parties agree to the process or if one
party wants the process and the other party agrees to it. CIETAC Arbitration Rules,
Article 40 available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). However,
CIETAC allows the arbitral tribunal to conciliate the dispute, which may cause parties to
avoid revealing all information for fear that if the conciliation process fails the tribunal
will hold that information against the party. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 40
available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
111. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 25 available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006).
112. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 26 available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). Along with this submission a party must include facts and reasons
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2. CIETAC's Structural and Procedural Flaws
While CIETAC has improved with respect to maintaining an
appearance of impartiality over the past twenty-five years, CIETAC still
has some procedural and structural flaws that undermine its appearance
of impartiality. Regardless of the actual impartiality and fairness of
CIETAC's arbitration process, western parties will hesitate to contract
freely into CIETAC arbitration if it appears unfair. Moreover, CIETAC
arbitration has received mixed reviews from foreign commentators that
have experienced the process," 3 which only further deters foreign
investors from contracting into the process.
CIETAC itself has the ability to appoint the third arbitrator if the
two party-appointed arbitrators fail to agree on a neutral third
arbitrator. 'l4 In practice, CIETAC authority almost always appoints a
Chinese arbitrator in these situations.1l 5 Such a practice encourages
Chinese parties to dispute the third arbitrator. By doing so, Chinese
parties can virtually ensure an arbitral panel made up of two Chinese
nationals versus only one foreign national, who may or may not hail
from the same nation as the foreign party. Implicitly, the presence of
two Chinese arbitrators sends a red flag to foreign parties, if for no other
reason than Chinese arbitrators understand the legal position of the
Chinese party better because of their rearing in the communist Chinese
society. Moreover, CIETAC does not compensate its arbitrators well,
making a position with the Chinese arbitral institution less attractive for
foreign arbitrators. 116
Second, CIETAC conducts all arbitrations in Chinese.' Unlike
English or even Spanish, Chinese is not a commonly accepted language
why they believe the arbitrator should be disqualified. Id. The challenge must be put in
no later than the first oral hearing. Id.
113. See infra notes 123-128.
114. See CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 107. If parties cannot agree on a
third party neutral within fifteen days, CIETAC will appoint that third arbitrator. Id.
115. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHUAS DERINGER, THE RESOLUTION OF CHINA DISPUTES
THROUGH ARBITRATION 17 (MAY 2004).
116. See Jerome A. Cohen, Dispute Resolution in China: Putting the House in Order,
CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE, No. 10 Vol. 15, 36 (Dec. 1, 2001). See also THE AMERICAN
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES REGARDING
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001) available at http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006).
117. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 67 available at http://www.cietac.org (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). Article 67 allows for the parties to contract in different languages.
Id. However, the official language of CIETAC arbitration is Chinese and, therefore,
without express language stating otherwise, the arbitration will take place in Chinese.
Furthermore, all CIETAC arbitrators must speak Chinese. Consequently, arbitrating in
other languages may disqualify some arbitrators simply because of a language barrier.
Id.
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in western cultures. The vast differences between western languages and
Asian languages such as Mandarin or Cantonese can cause gaps in
understanding and translation.1 18  Such misinterpretations frustrate
western parties and work in the favor of Chinese parties, especially if
Chinese arbitrators make up two-thirds of the panel.
Third, CIETAC conducts all arbitrations within China.119 While
this may seem obvious and non-threatening, the fact that the Chinese
communist system endorses diametrically opposed views from those of
western capitalists' views makes a great deal of difference to western
parties. A similar situation would take place if Ohio State had to play
Michigan every year in Michigan Stadium. While the rules of the game
remain the same, Michigan would have an implicit psychological
advantage. Chinese parties also tend to use the system more often,
giving them a greater familiarity and comfort with CIETAC arbitration
than western parties.12° In fact, CIETAC arbitrators often render their
decisions after only one hearing.'12  Even though this issue garners less
weight than those issues previously mentioned, it still adds to the
appearance of bias in favor of Chinese parties.
Even more troublesome than CIETAC's procedural flaws is the
dissatisfaction certain western parties have felt with CIETAC
arbitration. 122 While criticism of CIETAC is not abundantly prevalent,
123
it does exist. Combined with assumptions of unfairness based solely on
the Chinese form of government and the procedural flaws already
mentioned, these specific instances of dissatisfaction do illuminate the
risks of arbitrating with CIETAC that many foreign parties already
assume. 1
24
118. Xiaowen Qui, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties, 11 AM.
REv. INT'L ARB. 607, 634 (2000).
119. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, Article 2 available at http://www.cietac.org/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). While CIETAC rules now allow it to set up new arbitration
centers, it is not clear yet whether these centers can be outside the Chinese mainland. Id.
Furthermore, CIETAC has to date failed to exercise this option. Id.
120. CIETAC arbitration also tends to be much more informal than most western
arbitrations. See Johnson Tan, A Look at CIETAC: Is it Fair and Efficient? The China
International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission CIETAC has Become One of the
Busiest Arbitration Centers in the World. Along with its Heavy Caseload Have Come
Questions about CIETAC's Impartiality. How Accurate are the Allegations?, CHINA LAW
& PRACTICE (Apr. 1, 2003). Some observers compare the process to a meeting rather
than a hearing. Id. The process also usually lasts for one or two days. Id.
121. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHUAS DERINGER, THE RESOLUTION OF CHINA DISPUTES
THROUGH ARBITRATION 13 (MAY 2004).
122. See Cohen, supra note 116, at 36.
123. THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS OF AMERICAN
COMPANIES REGARDING ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001) available at
http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
124. Id.
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Jerome Cohen, a well-respected expert in dispute resolution in
China as well as a part-time New York University Law Professor, has
raised doubts of CIETAC's impartiality, stating "[t]he longer my
experience as either an advocate or an arbitrator in disputes presented to
[CIETAC], the graver my doubts have become about its independence
and impartiality."' 125 Other commentators have remarked that the system
lacks openness. 126  Specifically, questions have arisen about Chinese
arbitrators having secret discussions with Chinese parties during the
course of an arbitration. 127  For these reasons, some large American-
based corporate law firms have steered clients away from contracting
into CIETAC where possible, choosing rather to take their chances in the
court systems of Hong Kong or Singapore.
128
While in practice, parties that have had experience with CIETAC
arbitration have generally compared it equally to other international
arbitral institutions,12 9 both parties who have not experienced the process
and lawyers have found it to be less fair.130  Parties that have not
experienced CIETAC obviously base their response on reputation and
appearance. Therefore, regardless of the veracity of their beliefs,
CIETAC has a reputation problem. However, even more troubling to
CIETAC is the relatively uniform response from foreign lawyers,
classifying CIETAC arbitration as less fair than other arbitral
institutions.' 3 1 While CIETAC may ascribe some of this response to the
differences between the Chinese legal traditions and Civil and Common
law traditions, the institution must attribute much of this response to its
125. Jane Moir, Foreign businesses are being urged by their lawyers not to go to
China's official arbitration commission, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 3, 2001).
126. Evelyn Iritani, A Local Firm's Baffling Trip Through China's Arbitration
System: Origon Group Finds that the Country's Method of Resolving Disputes Still Lacks
Openess, Los ANGELAS TIMES (Dec. 26, 2003).
127. Jane Moir, Arbitration to Arbitrary, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HONG KONG)
(October 3, 2001).
128. Id.
129. THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS OF AMERICAN
COMPANIES REGARDING ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001) available at
http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). According to this survey,
twenty percent of parties that have had experience with CIETAC arbitration have thought
the system was more fair, forty percent about the same, and only twenty percent believed
it to be less fair. Id. Twenty percent of parties did not reply. Id.
130. See id. No parties surveyed found the CIETAC arbitration process fairer than
other international arbitral institutions. Id. 35% found it equally fair and 42% found it
less fair. Id. 23% of parties expressed no opinion. Id. Similarly, no lawyers surveyed
found the process fairer or even as fair. Id. A robust 67% found the process less fair and
33% did not respond. Id. Parties without experience attributed much of the problems
with CIETAC to the politics in the country. Id. Even parties who experienced the
arbitration process attribute the problems of CIETAC arbitration to the legal culture or
lack thereof among Chinese leaders. Id.
131. See id.
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own procedural and structural flaws that do not appear in other reputable
international arbitral institutions. Furthermore, these same lawyers will
undoubtedly advise their clients of the risks of arbitrating through
CIETAC. '32
IV. Problems with Ensuring Neutrals with the Soviet Union and Iran
The experiences of U.S. parties with Iran and the Soviet Union
during the 1980s can act as a guide to U.S. parties in China. In both
experiences, U.S. parties had a pressing economic need to settle disputes.
Additionally, in both situations the nations engineered unique solutions
to ensure, for the most part, the impartiality of the arbitrators resolving
their disputes.
A. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal serves as an example of how to
effectively resolve disputes between parties from ideologically polar
opposite nations. While far from perfect, the tribunal has managed to
resolve disputes totaling over $2.5 billion dollars. 133 Furthermore, the
tribunal has also provided a broad framework from which future
tribunals and arbitral institutions should learn. Ultimately, the tribunal's
successes, continuing to this day, serve as a watershed in international
arbitration because of the tribunal's unique ability to resolve disputes
between diametrically opposed nations. 1
34
1. Background
The Algiers Accords established the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to
132. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHUAS DERINGER, supra note 115, at 13.
133. JeffBleich, The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1221, 1221 (1999)
(reviewing CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESHKE, THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (1998)).
134. Before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, nations would solve disputes of this sort in
one of three ways. The nations could go to war and resolve their disputes through
military might and subversive tactics. World War II and the Cold War provide excellent
examples of this more primal form of dispute resolution. If one or both nations did not
want war, the dispute could be solved through political means. However, unlike the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal, such political dispute resolution did not look at the merits of each
dispute, but rather focused on a means of political compromise to save face and/or
bloodshed. In these situations, one party or nation often came out ahead. Examples of
this form of dispute resolution include the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1938 Munich
Pact. Finally, a nation's party could simply cut their losses and solve the dispute by
avoiding it. In this situation, some parties will lose virtually everything without any form
ofjust compensation. Examples of this form of dispute resolution include U.S. interest in
Cuba after the Cuban Revolution and western interests in China after Mao Zedong and
the communists took power in the late 1940s.
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resolve the commercial disputes that stemmed from the 1979 Islamic
Revolutionary takeover of the state of Iran, which included the 444 day
standoff between the nations, where revolutionaries seized and held
captive American citizens inside the American embassy in Tehran.'35 In
response to this act, the U.S. froze over $14 billion worth of Iranian
assets in U.S. banks. 136 Consequently, U.S. parties filed approximately
4,700 private claims against Iran to recover for business interests lost in
Iran after the hostile takeover.
1 37
Established in 1981 in The Hague, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
resolved approximately 95% of the claims within ten years.
138
Amazingly, the Tribunal resolved these disputes in a period where the
U.S. and Iran not only lacked diplomatic relations, but also had general
hostility towards each other, evidenced by notable events such as the
sinking of the Iran Ajar in 1987 by the U.S. military, the Iran-Contra
affair and alleged Iranian complicity in the taking and holding of
American hostages in Lebanon. 139  Yet amidst all the turmoil, the
Tribunal managed to provide a peaceful and relatively fair method for
both U.S. and Iranian parties to resolve their disputes.
140
Like most international arbitrations, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
contained three-man panels, composed of one arbitrator chosen by the
American party, one chosen by the Iranian party, and a neutral arbitrator
chosen from a neutral nation. 141 A modified version of UNCITRAL
rules governed the Tribunal arbitrations.142
2. Problems
The Tribunal did not always run as smoothly as the United States,
the Netherlands, or Iran would have liked. Much of the difficulties arose
135. See Bleich, supra note 133, at 1222-23.
136. See http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/1 1/14/iran.usa.reut/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006).
137. The U.S. Department of State Official Website available at
http://www.state.gov/s/U/3199.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
138. Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: How
May They Be Applied in the Case ofIraq?, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 421,421 (1991-1992).
139. See id. at 421-22.
140. See generally GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL (Oxford
University Press) (1996). General information on the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is
available at http://www.iusct.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
141. See Mosk, supra note 12, at 255.
142. John D. Franchini, International Arbitration Under the UNCITAL Arbitration
Rules: A Contractual Provision for Improvement, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2229-30
(MAY 1994). UNCITRAL stands for United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law. See http://www.uncitral.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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in regard to the impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators. 143 Although,
the Tribunal proved effective, the problems the Tribunal had with
regards to impartial arbitrators surely will repeat themselves in future
arbitrations involving parties from diametrically opposed nations.
First, the rules failed to sufficiently define the standards of
impartiality. While the rules governed the process by which a party
could challenge the impartiality of an arbitrator, the final decision fell in
the Chief Justice's objective discretion. 144 UNCITRAL Rules allowed
for a challenge of an arbitrator on the basis of "justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator's impartiality."' 145 However, the rules only indirectly define a
standard for impartiality and independence. 1
46
Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Rules also gave parties fifteen days
either from the time of appointment or from the time a party learns
justifiable doubts to challenge an arbitrator. 147  This raised issues of
whether the party had to actively seek information on the other party
appointed-arbitrator's neutrality. 48 Similarly, it again raised issues of
the standard of impartiality used by the Chief Justice.
The Tribunal also had trouble adapting to the cultural barriers that
existed between Iranian and U.S. parties. Ultimately, U.S. arbitrators
had a certain level of freedom from their government that Iranian
arbitrators did not. 149 As a result, other arbitrators felt that the Iranian
arbitrators worked for the Tehran government rather than as objective
arbitrators. 50 In fact, at some level, the bias of the Iranian arbitrators
may have actually driven the neutral arbitrators toward the American
arbitrators who attempted to act with a greater level of neutrality.
1 51
A poignant demonstration of this problem occurred by way of the
attack on Judge Mangard, a neutral arbitrator, by two Iranian arbitrators
143. See infra notes 144-157.
144. Stewart Abercrombie Baker & Mark David Davis, Establishment of an Arbitral
Tribunal Under the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
23 INT'L LAW. 81 (Spring 1989).
145. UNCITRAL Rules art. 10.
146. See Baker & Davis, supra note 144.
147. UNCITRAL Rules art. 11.
148. See Franchini, supra note 142, at 2237-39. See also Robert H. Smit & Nicholas
Shaw, The Center for Public Resource Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of
International Disputes: A Critical and Comparative Commentary, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
275,289-90 (1997).
149. See Mosk, supra note 12 at 267-268.
150. See id. at 268.
151. See Nancy Armoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeni: Presidential
Transitions and International Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 437-439 (Jan. 2001). Another
example of impartiality occurred when an Iranian arbitrator illegally advised an Iranian
party of the outcome of an arbitration before it occurred, prompting the Iranian party to
go into eleventh hour negotiations. See Baker & Davis, supra note 144 at, notes 133-134.
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in September 1984.152 The two assailants attacked Mangard, who was
expected to be named acting president of the tribunal, on his way to the
office. 153 The assailants apparently justified their position by claiming
that Mangard implicitly allied with the United States. 154 However, such
an attack may actually provide proof of the Iranian arbitrators'
impartiality. In the end, the attack caused a delay in the tribunal's
proceedings and led directly to the dismissal of the two assailants from
the tribunal's panel of arbitrators.
155
Finally, the tribunal resolved cases slowly, especially during its
early years. 156 Due in large part to the problems discussed above as well
as the simple logistical problems of having two diametrically opposed
nations agree on anything, the process did not reach fruition as quickly as
desired. However, within ten years, the Tribunal managed to resolve
approximately ninety-five percent of the claims. 
157
3. Successes of Claims Tribunal
The results of the Tribunal display its success. In similar
revolutions by governments adverse to the United States in China and
Cuba earlier in the Twentieth Century, U.S. parties lost virtually all of
their investment with little or no means of just compensation.
158
Although the process did not happen overnight, U.S. parties eventually
received just compensation for their lost investment in Iran, which
totaled approximately 2.5 billion dollars. 59
The tribunal could not have achieved this success without the
appearance of impartiality. The simple fact that the tribunal held its
hearings in the Netherlands, respected for its relative neutrality, added to
152. See Iranian Arbitrators Attack Mangard, IALR 9, 170 (Sept. 5, 1984). See also
Baker & Davis, supra note 144. There were actually many challenges by arbitrators on
both sides. Id.
153. See Baker & Davis, supra note 144.
154. See id. at note 143.
155. See id. at note 148.
156. See Bleich, supra note 133, at 1237-38.
157. See Brower, supra note 138, at 421.
158. After the Communist Revolutions in China, 1949, and Cuba, 1959, the new
governments nationalized their businesses, leaving most American investors with little or
no compensation. The polarized atmosphere of the Cold War made it difficult to threaten
specific reprisals without the fear of Soviet intervention on the side of the Communist
nations. See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/castro/timeline/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006)
(chronicling the post-revolution governmental actions in Cuba); see also Debbie Liao &
Philip Sohmen, The Development of Modern China, 1 STAN. J. E. ASIAN. AFFAIRS (Spring
2001) 27, 27-29 (discussing the nationalization of Chinese Private enterprise under Mao
Zedong).
159. U.S. State Department Official Website available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
3199.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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the tribunal's legitimacy. 60  Even with the problems experienced with
respect to the bias of the party-appointed arbitrators,1 61 the neutral
arbitrators provided an impartial presence needed in a tribunal in which
the parties polar opposite views virtually ensured an inherent bias by the
party-appointed arbitrators. 
162
The general international standard of having completely neutral
party-appointed arbitrators failed in this tribunal. 163 However, with such
diametrically opposed views, such a result seems logical. Although the
inherent question of impartiality slowed the tribunal, the problem
stemmed less from the fact that party-appointed arbitrators held this
apparent bias, but rather from the lack of a defined standard of what
constituted a violation of neutrality. In fact, party-appointed arbitrators
may have helped ensure the ultimate success of the tribunal by allowing
both parties to feel that their legal position had been advocated and
understood within the tribunal. 164
B. U.S.-Soviet Arbitration During Perestroika
Western parties encountered even more pronounced problems
finding neutral dispute resolution forums with the Soviet Union than
currently in China. From 1945 to 1991, the eastern block nations such as
the Soviet Union had waged war against the West, not necessarily on the
battlefield, but always in the economy and minds of citizens. 165 As a
result, world views remained polarized, making it difficult to find neutral
third parties trusted by both sides.
Beginning with the ascension of Mikhael Gorbachev to the
premiership in 1985, Soviet economic interests began to open to the
160. See N.V. Handelsbureau la Mola v. Kennedy, 370 U.S. 940, 940 (1962) (Black J.
dissenting). This case presents only one of many examples of the Netherlands neutrality
which extends from their neutrality in 1756 during the Seven Years War to its neutrality
pact in 1939. The Hague is also the location of the International Criminal Court as well
as a number of historic conventions known for their neutrality such as the 1907
convention. See International Criminal Court Official Website available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
161. See supra notes 143-151.
162. See Mosk, supra note 12, at 263.
163. See generally Richard A. Mosk, Lessons From The Hague-An Update on the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 819 (1987); Combs, supra
note 151, at 437-39.
164. See Mosk, supra note 12, at 253.
165. The Cold War lasted from 1945, the end of World War II, to approximately
1991, the fall of the Soviet Union. Some experts also claim that the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 ended the Cold War. A vast amount of information about all aspects of the
Cold War is available at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2006).
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West. 16 6  This dramatic change in Soviet economic foreign policy,
otherwise known as "perestroika,"1 67 made it necessary for the eastern
and western parties to find an acceptable dispute resolution forum to
resolve the increased number of business disputes between the blocks.
1. Arbitration in the Soviet Union
Founded in the 1930s, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
(FTAC) acted as the Soviet Union's arbitral institution of choice for
disputes involving international parties. 68  Like CIETAC in China, the
USSR's Chamber of Commerce controlled FTAC, indirectly making it
an extension of the government in Moscow. 169 This trait of FTAC gave
it the appearance of impartiality that further structural problems only
managed to enhance. 
170
First, all FTAC arbitrators were Soviet nationals.' 71 While FTAC
rules did not prohibit foreign nationals from becoming FTAC arbitrators,
in practice the Chamber of Commerce did not appoint any foreign
nationals.1 72  Consequently, western parties could not appoint an
arbitrator whom they felt understood their western position. Moreover,
166. See W. Gary Vause, Perestroika and Market Socialism: The Effects of
Communism's Slow Thaw on East-West Economic Relations, 9 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
213,216-17 (Fall 1988).
167. See supra note 6 for more information on perestroika. See also V.A. Kabatov,
Arbitration in the USSR: The 1988 Statute and Rules of the Arbitration Court of the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 5 ARB. INT'L 45, 48 (1989). The article
states, generally, that an increased number of Soviet organizations had been given
import/export rights, a direct result of Gorbachev's perestroika policies. Id.
168. See Kaj Hober, Arbitration in Moscow, 3 ARB. INT'L 119, 121 (1987).
169. See id. at 121. See also Vladimir Orlov, Arbitration Procedure in East-West
Trade, 55 NORDIc J. INT'L LAW 310, 312 (1986) (describing the differences in procedure
between arbitration in the Soviet Union through FTAC and the institutions to which
western parties are generally accustomed).
170. See generally id.
171. See Hober, supra note 168, at 123, 146. Under Soviet legal theory, social
organizations are different than a state organization in that, theoretically, the state does
not have coercive powers over its members. Id. However, while technically the
Chamber of Commerce is not subordinate to the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry and
therefore a social organization, in practice the Chamber of Commerce made up part of the
Soviet foreign trade monopoly. Id. Consequently, the Soviet government indirectly has
power over FTAC, a result which presumably was created by the Soviet government to
have FTAC appear neutral while at the same time not fall from the web of party power.
Id. However, this structure did not go unnoticed by western lawyers who questioned the
legal fairness of FTAC. Id.
172. See id. at 128. While neither Soviet statutes nor Rules of Procedure contain any
restrictions with respect to the citizenship of FTAC arbitrators, in practice the Chamber
of Commerce only promoted Soviet citizens. Id. Thus, it can be expected that Soviet
arbitrators typically have the same "general economic and legal outlook as the Soviet
party in the dispute." Idat 158.
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the Chamber of Commerce elected arbitrators to serve four-year terms, 173
further tying arbitrator's personal interests into those of the Chamber of
Commerce.
Second, all arbitrations took place within the Soviet Union.1
74
Winston Churchill did not call the border separating eastern and western
bloc nations the "Iron Curtain" for no reason. 175 Life behind the curtain
was intimidating, not only for western parties who generally did not live
in such a restricted atmosphere, but also for eastern parties who knew
one faulty move could endanger their lives. 176 Thus, the fact that FTAC
arbitration took place in Moscow put an immediate red flag up to western
parties.
Third, the entire process of determining impartiality of an arbitrator
remained internal. 177 The Soviet government could have circumvented
some of FTAC's problems associated with its entanglement to the
arbitration process if it delegated decision making regarding the
challenges to impartiality to an outside party with some western ties.
However, the Soviet government had a hand in deciding all these
challenges.
178
173. See Wim A. Timmermans, The New Statute on the Arbitration Court at the
USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 5 J. INT'L ARB. No. 3 97, 101 (1988). If it
was not enough that an adverse opinion by FTAC arbitrators could prompt a midnight
visit for the KGB, arbitrators also had four-year terms. See Hober, supra note 168, at
127. If the presidium decided not to re-elect an arbitrator, his options in the legal world
may have been limited, depending upon their reasons for not re-electing him. Id. All this
said, the Chamber of Commerce usually reappointed arbitrators when their terms expired.
Id. The author failed to analyze this process though. Re-election could easily have
occurred because most arbitrators followed the party's ideal conduct and decision
making, rather than for their reputation for conducting fair and neutral arbitrations.
174. FTAC Rules § 6. See also Kabatov, supra note 167. All arbitrations were
conducted in Russian. Id. It may be conducted in another language with the consent of
the tribunal. Id.
175. Iron Curtain Speech made by Winston Churchill at Westminster College, Fulton,
Missouri (March 5, 1946). This speech introduced the term "Iron Curtain" into the
popular vernacular to describe the division between the geographical areas of the west
and east. Id.
176. See generally, PETER STRAFFORD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE COMMUNIST
WORLD; AN EYEWITNESS REPORT OF LIFE, LOVE AND THE HUMAN CONDITION BEHIND THE
IRON CURTAIN (Binding Unknown, 1967). See also Katherine B. Eaton, DAILY LIFE IN
THE SOVIET UNION (Greenwood Press) (2004).
177. See Pat K. Chew, A Procedural and Substantive Analysis of the Fairness of
Chinese and Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitrations, 21 TEX. INT'L L. J. 291, 304 (1985-1986).
See also Hober, supra note 168, at 146. FTAC also did not impose any disclosure
requirements among their arbitrators, calling into question the arbitrators impartiality
right from the onset. Id.
178. FTAC Rules § 22, para. 1-2. See also Chew, supra note 177, at 303-304. A
party could challenge the partiality of one or more arbitrators. Id. If the party challenged
one arbitrator, then the remaining two arbitrators ruled on the issue. Id. If more than one
arbitrator's neutrality was called into question, FTAC itself would decide the issue. Id.
[Vol. 110:3
SOLVING THE PITFALLS OF IMPARTIALITY
While FTAC scholars and the Soviet government preached the
impartiality of FTAC as an arbitral institution to the outside world,
179
evidence exists suggesting otherwise.18 0  One specific example existed
where FTAC did not allow the Israeli government to present their case
because the arbitrators instructed by the government had already decided
the case beforehand.' Even though such blatant bias may have been
isolated, the trend of impartiality towards western/industrial nations
seemed to have continued. In a study conducted by Pat Chew, a leading
scholar, he found that in disputes involving one party from the Soviet
Union and another from an eastern bloc country, FTAC remained
virtually neutral.8 2  However, the study concluded that when the
claimant was from an industrial/western nation and the defendant hailed
from the Soviet Union, the claimant only prevailed 24% of the time.1
8 3
Furthermore, when the claimant was from the USSR and the defendant
hailed from a western/industrial nation, FTAC arbitrators rendered an
award in favor of the Soviet party 89% of the time.18 4  Such results
seemed to justify western parties' fears of arbitrating with FTAC in the
179. See Hober, supra note 168 at 154. See also Chew, supra note 177 at 302.
180. See infra notes 181-183.
181. See J. Lew, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AwARDs 30-31 (1978). A short description of the
repercussions of FTAC's decision in the Soviet-Israeli Oil Arbitration of 1958 follows:
That dispute arose out of the refusal by the Soviet Government to grant an
export license in respect for oil meant for Israel. The refusal was a political act
of the Soviet Government, in retaliation for the Israeli Suez campaign of 1956.
When the Israeli purchaser claimed damages from the Soviet exporting
enterprise, the FTAC made a very short and cursory award after an equally
cursory hearing. Reports followed the award that the Israeli's [sic] had been
denied an opportunity to put their case, the decision had been dictated by the
Soviet government and the arbitrators had decided their award before hearing
the parties. It was further reported that a Soviet professor who had been
instructed by the Israeli's had been allowed to give evidence against the Israeli
party. This award caused a furor [sic] in the west, amongst both lawyers and
businessmen, and did more to undermine the reputation of socialist arbitration
than any other fact.
Id. at 30. A translated and reproduced copy of the award is available in 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 800(1959).
182. See Chew, supra note 177 at 325-329. The eastern bloc or COMECON
countries Chew included were Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Id.
The foreign, yet eastern block nation prevailed in 43% of the arbitrations available. Id.
183. See id.
184. See id. The survey Chew took looked at the arbitrations available to him. Id.
Being a very secretive society, the Soviet Union did not release all arbitrations conducted
by FTAC to the general public. An assumption can be made that if all cases had been
released the ratios probably would be even more skewed towards the Soviet parties
because, presumably, the government withheld arbitration results from disputes that the
government had an interest in keeping confidential. Most likely the non-published
arbitrations are the types of dispute that the Soviet government would have an interest in
prevailing.
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Soviet Union.
2. Effectiveness of Arbitrating with Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce
Due to the mutual mistrust between the U.S. and Soviet Union with
regards to arbitrating in the other's nation, the parties of both nations
implicitly agreed to the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) as an
alternative venue to resolve much of their trade disputes.185 During the
Cold War, Sweden presented a unique position of a moderately socialist
government with a well-chronicled history of neutrality.186  Such a
position made it an ideal forum to arbitrate east-west trade disputes.
187
The presumed impartiality of the SCC Institute allowed it flexibility
with its rules. The SCC basically followed a freedom of contract
principle with the institution maintaining the power to conduct the
arbitration as it seemed fit within the bounds of the contract, agreed upon
by both parties.1 88 Generally, tribunals consisted of three-man panels,
with each party appointing one arbitrator and the SCC Institute
appointing the presiding arbitrator.' 89  Similarly, the SCC maintained
broad and non-descript disclosure policies.190  The SCC ultimately
decided on any accusations of impartiality of arbitrators with little or no
stated guidelines to their decision. 9 While not the optimal procedure
for international arbitrations, other factors such as location, history, and
background made both parties feel assured of the process' impartiality.
192
185. See Edwin R. Alley, International Arbitration: The Alternative of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, 22 INT'L LAW. 837, Notes 7-9 (Fall 1998). The SCC Institute
was founded in 1917 and originally served Swedish domestic arbitration. See
http://www.sccinstiute.com/uk/About (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). Starting in the late
1970s, the SCC began to serve as a forum to resolve east-west Trade disputes. Id.
186. See Volker Viechtbauer, Arbitration in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355, 450-51
(Winter 1993). Sweden's arbitration law also met international standards and was easily
accessible to foreign parties because of the availability of accurate English translations.
Id.
187. See W. Lawrence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and
Practices of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 14-15 (Winter
1995).
188. See Alley, supra note 185 at notes 15-22.
189. See Volker Viechtbauer, Arbitration in Russia, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 355, 451
(Winter 1993). The SCC formed their tribunals with a choice of six arbitrators from
Eastern European countries (excluding the the USSR), six arbitrators from western
nations (excluding the U.S.), and six neutral presiding arbitrators from Sweden. See also
Arbitration Clause for Optimal Use in U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Trade, 1978 Y.B. Arb. 299, 299.
190. See Alley, supra note 185 at notes 15-22.
191. See id; see also Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Official Website available at
http:/www.sccinstitute.com/uk/About (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). According to the SCC
Website, in 1988 the arbitration institute revised its rules of arbitration for the purposes of
making the arbitral procedures more international. Id.
192. See generally Alley, supra note 185.
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According to the SCC Institute Secretary-General Ulf Franke, objections
to arbitrators or the arbitration agreements were infrequent.1 93 After the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the SCC Institute has continued to take
an active role in resolving disputes between former Soviet-bloc
nations.194
V. Analysis of Comparisons Between Problems Western Parties Have
Arbitrating in China with Similar Problems Western Parties Had in
Iran and the Soviet Union
The lessons learned with Iran and the Soviet Union should serve as
a guide to improve the appearance of neutrality for international
arbitrations in China. While improving, CIETAC still has major
structural flaws that adjustments similar to those made by the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal and SCC Institute can resolve. Similar to China, in the
two aforementioned situations, the governments of Iran and the Soviet
Union fundamentally opposed western ideals, yet still managed to find
an acceptable method of resolving their disputes. Ultimately, once the
nations had agreed to open their economy to world investment, they to
some extent had to forego their ideals to achieve a workable form of
dispute resolution. Although CIETAC has gradually capitulated to this
process, the entrance of China to the WTO calls for more rapid
changes.195
A. Make Up of the Tribunals
The power to form the tribunal under its rules gives an institution
such as CIETAC the power to ensure a fair and neutral arbitration. As a
result, the fact that CIETAC appears to not only try to guarantee neutral
arbitrations, but also to some extent looks to ensure the interests of the
Chinese government, may harm its legitimacy in the eyes of western
parties.196 , While in practice CIETAC may conduct fair proceedings,
without alterations to its structural and procedural make-up, western
193. See id at note 22.
194. See Deborah 1. Holland, Drafting a dispute resolution provision in international
commercial contracts, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 464 (Spring 2000).
195. See, e.g., More Work Needed on System Environment, BUSINESS DAILY UPDATE
FINANCIAL TIMES INFORMATION (May 18, 2004); Tsai Ing-Wen, A New Era in Cross-
Straight Relations? Tsai Ing-Wen Comments on the Implications of Taiwan's and
China 's Entry to the World Trade Organization, 27 No.4 NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW 10, 10-17 (July 1, 2002); THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS
OF AMERICAN COMPANIES REGARDING ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001), available at
http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited Nov. 1, 2005). But see, e.g. Sino-
German Trade Relations to Grow, BUSINESS DAILY UPDATE FINANCIAL TIMES
INFORMATION (Dec. 7, 2004).
196. See id.
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lawyers will not be satisfied with impartiality of its arbitration process. 197
1. Presiding Arbitrator
In a standard three-man tribunal, the presiding arbitrator carries the
most influence. Theoretically, in close cases, each party-appointed
arbitrator will vote with the party that appointed him, leaving the
ultimate decision to the presiding arbitrator. Consequently, the
impartiality of this arbitrator becomes paramount.
Currently, Chinese parties can virtually ensure that the presiding
arbitrator will hail from China if their party-appointed arbitrator will not
agree on a foreign national.' 98 Similar to the problems experienced with
FTAC tribunals, this fact leaves the western party arbitrating in China
outnumbered on the panel. Even though the presiding Chinese national
may intend to act with the utmost neutrality, his upbringing and
background in the communist society presumably implants an inherent
bias in his legal views. Consequently, presiding arbitrators in disputes
between Chinese and American parties should hail from a neutral third
nation. Such a proposition worked to great success in the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunals and the SCC Institute, where any other proposal likely
would have come under great scrutiny from one of the two parties.'
99
Presiding arbitrators should also have an extensive knowledge of
both cultures. The purpose of the neutral third arbitrator is not to
disqualify all nationals simply for their residency, but rather to attempt to
eliminate inherent bias that disclosure rules themselves cannot
effectively eliminate. However, this rule should not discount arbitrators
from Hong Kong who have a dual education in both the western
capitalist society and the eastern communist philosophy, even though
technically they now hail from China.2 °° In fact, rather than create
jurisdictional boundaries outside those of Mainland China and the United
197. While comparing favorably to an institution such as FTAC, western parties still
may view CIETAC as an extension of the Communist government in Beijing. Therefore,
western parties assume the system is flawed and biased against them unless proven
otherwise. See THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS OF AMERICAN
COMPANIES REGARDING ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001), available at
http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
198. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text. If the Chinese parties want
two Chinese arbitrators, they need only dispute the appointment of third arbitrator,
shifting the decision to CIETAC. Id. While CIETAC could appoint anyone as presiding
arbitrator, in practice they have almost always appointed a Chinese national. Id.
199. The author bases such assumptions on the problems that occurred in the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal, see supra notes 142-156 and accompanying text, as well as those
that occurred with FTAC. See supra notes 168-184 and accompanying text.
200. The British controlled Hong Kong for 156 years, finally giving control of the
city back to China on July 1, 1997. See http://www.nytimes.com/specials/hongkong/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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States (or the western nation involved), the arbitral institution should
administer a comprehensive legal test covering the legal traditions of
both nations to all arbitrators before allowing party-appointed arbitrators
to consider them as the presiding arbitrator. While this may disqualify
some arbitrators, it will leave a pool of expert presiding arbitrators well
versed in the legal traditions of both parties. Implementation of such a
plan will look to build on the successes achieved at the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal while at the same time seek to avoid the problems that tribunal
encountered.
Even with these rules regarding qualifications of presiding
arbitrators, CIETAC, or a new institution, needs to impose a disclosure
requirement. Mimicking the FTAC's lack of a disclosure requirement 20'
immediately calls the entire arbitration into question. In the spring of
2004, the International Bar Association (IBA) established a color coded
system for disclosure of arbitrators.2 °2 While such a system certainly will
ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator, it may also disqualify competent
arbitrators, causing the system to run less efficiently. That said, such a
system does have advantages in determining presiding arbitrators for
international arbitrations, especially between parties from two nations
that inherently distrust each other. Consequently, for presiding
arbitrators, and only for presiding arbitrators, CIETAC should adopt the
system for disclosure requirements proposed by the IBA.2 °3 However,
the institution should allow the parties to wave these requirements if the
opposing party deems the arbitrator acceptable after learning of the
disclosure requirements.
Logistically, this would force some overhaul of CIETAC.
Currently, about two-thirds of arbitrators hail from China.204 Adopting
these suggestions obviously would create more work for foreign
201. See Chew, supra note 177, at 304.
202. IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, Approved
22 May 2004 by the Council of the International Bar Association available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf (last visited Jan. 24,
2006). The IBA divided disclosure requirements into three categories: Red, Orange, and
Green. They deemed the Red requirements non-waivable. Id. Such items included a
relationship of arbitrator to the dispute, an arbitrator's direct of indirect interest in the
dispute and an arbitrator's current relationship with the parties or counsel. Id. Disclosure
items on the Orange list are waivable at the parties discretion and include, previous
services for one of the parties or other involvement in the dispute, current services for one
of the parties by the arbitrators law firm, a relationship between an arbitrator and another
arbitrator or counsel, a relationship between the arbitrator and others involved in the
arbitration, and other circumstances described in Section 3.5 of the Rules. Id. This
footnote only generally lays out the IBA guidelines. Id. For a more detailed analysis,
one should visit the website. Id.
203. See id. Applying these stringent standards will ensure the impartiality of the
presiding arbitrator. Id.
204. See http://www.cietac.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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arbitrators and less for Chinese arbitrators. Even though the Chinese
government will not fancy such a result, these changes are a necessary
step to improve the appearance of impartiality of CIETAC arbitrations.
2. Party-Appointed Arbitrators
Party-appointed arbitrators present a different dilemma altogether.
Generally, international rules require party-appointed arbitrators to
conduct themselves in the same manner as a neutral presiding
arbitrator.2 °5 While this may prove effective in disputes between like
nations such as France and Germany, it does not enjoy the same type of
success in arbitrations between diametrically opposed nations.
Institutions may alleviate some of the distrust that permeates through all
disputes between these types of nations by permitting party-appointed
arbitrators to advocate to some extent for the party who appointed them.
Western experiences with SCC Institute and Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal provide examples of the success achieved when implementing
this standard. In both situations, the institutions managed to balance the
interests and fears of both parties to provide a neutral arbitration for both.
So long as there exists an assurance of impartiality of the presiding
arbitrator, allowing for party-appointed arbitrators to partially advocate
for the party that appointed them 20 6 may prove most effective in disputes
between parties from politically polar nations. Experienced arbitrators in
similar situations, such as Judge Richard A. Mosk, have advocated such
a stance. 207 Having a party-appointed arbitrator partially advocate their
party's position helps to ease any fear of mistrust stemming from
political differences as well as ensures that tribunal understands that
party's legal position.20 8 Without such assurances, the parties may not
feel comfortable contracting into the arbitration for fear of unfairness.
However, the institution needs to curtail the advocating of party-
appointed arbitrators to the point where the arbitrator advocates as
someone knowledgeable about the legal culture and position from which
their party speaks, rather than as someone familiar with the particular
party. The fact that a party had appointed that arbitrator in a prior
proceeding should not disqualify him, but if the arbitrator had acted as
legal counsel for that party within the last seven years, it should.20 9
205. See supra note 38.
206. See supra note 32 (highlighting the U.S. jurisdictions that have ruled in favor of
this procedure).
207. See Mosk, supra note 12, at 253-270 (highlighting and advocating the
advantages of having party-appointed arbitrators with some level of bias towards the
party whom appointed them).
208. See id.
209. Seven years, in many ways, is an arbitrary number. However, the author felt that
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Furthermore, the party-appointed arbitrator needs to disclose all prior
business relations with the party. 210  If the institution deems that the
arbitrator has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, then it should
disqualify him. In the end, though, the institution should govern party-
appointed arbitrators with the assumption of allowance.
If the system works correctly, disputes should arise where even the
party-appointed arbitrators will vote against the party that appointed
them. Although the rules should forbid direct communications between
all arbitrators and parties during the course of the arbitration,211 party-
appointed arbitrators should act as a conduit of ideas and positions
between the party which appointed them and the tribunal as a whole.
3. Location of Tribunal
Like with FTAC, the fact that CIETAC conducts all arbitration
within mainland China results in an assumption of impartiality.2 12 The
comfort level and familiarity the home party feels provides them with a
psychological advantage.213 Furthermore, arbitrations conducted through
institutions in communist or totalitarian nations come with the increased
danger of government intervention, whether directly or indirectly.
The successes that the U.S. achieved in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce could not have
occurred without the neutral location of these institutions.214 Both
Stockholm and The Hague have a long chronicled history of neutrality.
CIETAC, or a like institution, need not arbitrate in a historically neutral
venue, although this would not hurt. Rather, the optimal site for
arbitrations between China and the U.S. may be Hong Kong. Although
technically a part of China, Hong Kong has separate economic rules
five years was too short of a time period and ten years was too long.
210. See IBA Guidelines, supra note 202. This idea originates from the IBA
guidelines and serves as a way to ensure that both parties have accurate knowledge
concerning the arbitrators deciding their dispute.
211. See Baker & Davis, supra note 144, at notes 133-134. An Iranian arbitrator
during the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal informed an Iranian party of an adverse ruling the
night before the tribunal rendered the decision prompting the Iranian party to initiate
eleventh hour settlement negotiations. Id. CIETAC must prevent such an outcome from
ever occurring because it calls into question the integrity of the arbitrator as well as the
institution in general. Id.
212. Linda Himelstein, Is The Soviet Union Ready for This; Steptoe Venture to
Dispense Private Justice, AM. LAWYER NEWSPAPERS GROUP INC. LEGAL TIMES 1, 18 (Oct.
29, 1990). Timothy Heinsz, Dean of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law
states, "People by nature don't want to be in someone else's home court." Id.
213. See supra Part III.C.2.
214. This statement reflects the opinion of the author, but it has support from other
scholars in this area. See e.g. Himelstein, supra note 212, at 18.
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favorable to capitalist societies 21 5 as well as a history of western control
prior to 1998.216
After its relative success handling east-west disputes during the
Cold War,217 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Institute also is
another logical neutral venue to handle such disputes. Although
geographically it inconveniences both China and the U.S., both nations
have commented positively on the process. 218 Other plausible neutral
venues include Geneva and Zurich.219
4. Language
Like with venue, holding the entire arbitral proceedings in a
language foreign to one of the parties gives CIETAC an aura of bias.
CIETAC conducts their arbitrations in Chinese.220 Such a practice
contrasts with the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, where the
proceedings took place dually in English and Farsi 1  While not as
important as ensuring the neutrality of the arbitrators themselves,
215. See Frances M. Luke, The Imminent Threat of China's Intervention in Macau's
Autonomy: Using Hong Kong's Past to Secure Macau 's Future, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
717, 726, 736 (2000).
216. Hong Kong International Arbitration Council Official Website available at
http://www.hkiac.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). HKIAC was established in 1985,
twelve years before the handover of Hong Kong back to China. Id. Thus, for
international arbitrations they generally use UNCITRAL Rules, the same set of rules used
during the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Id. Although not focused on in this comment,
parties will also tend to have an easier time enforcing arbitral awards in Hong Kong than
on the mainland. Id. Currently, HKIAC handles fewer arbitrations than CIETAC (709
versus 287 in 2003). See id.
217. See supra Part IV.B.2.
218. See Edwin R. Alley, International Arbitration: The Alternative of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, 22 INT'L LAW. 837, n.9 (Fall 1988).
219. See generally Dietrich Schindler, Neutrality, Morality and the Holocaust;
Neutrality and Morality: Developments in Switzerland and the International Community,
14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 155, 155-163 (1998). Switzerland has stayed historically neutral
since the Sixteenth century for better or for worse. The Swiss have carried the idea that
neutrality is a guarantee of internal freedom and democracy against foreign interference.
Fortunately, allied nations, such as the United States and England have allowed the Swiss
to maintain this principle through World War I, World War II and the Cold War. On
another note, Switzerland is a beautiful nation with much strategic importance in Europe.
The difficulty of invading its mountainous terrain has also helped maintain Swiss
neutrality. Geneva is the home of WTO headquarters. See World Trade Organization
Official Website available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/thewtoe.htm (last
visited Jan. 24, 2006). While not a major player in dispute resolution, it does have an
arbitration branch capable of handling disputes. Id. One advantage arbitrating with the
WTO or in Switzerland in general would be the overriding presumption of neutrality,
similar to what the U.S. and Soviet Union found when arbitrating in Sweden.
220. This practice is similar to that used in FTAC arbitrations, where all arbitrations
were conducted in Russian. See supra note 173.
221. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Rules of Procedure, Article 17 available at
http://www.iusct.org/tribunal-rules.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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conducting the arbitration in both English and Chinese will alleviate
confusion and discomfort among foreign parties. This practice also
should not hinder the proceedings substantially. Consequently,
implementing this practice will make CIETAC arbitration more attractive
to foreign parties.
5. Compensation of Arbitrators
Ultimately, CIETAC could not implement the changes needed to
ensure neutrality without better compensating their arbitrators. The
current practice of frugal compensation of arbitrators deters foreign
arbitrators from becoming CIETAC arbitrators.222 With the amount of
money involved in the disputes handled by CIETAC, it has the ability to
compensate arbitrators commensurate to other international arbitral
institutions.223
The lack of compensation of arbitrators also highlights the
involvement of the Chinese government in CIETAC arbitration.
Regardless of the direct level of involvement of the government with
CIETAC, the fact that compensation remains so low, presumably as a
result of communist economic policies, suggests the government exerts
substantial influence over CIETAC.224  In order attract the best
international arbitrators, the Chinese government and/or the Chamber of
Commerce must compensate arbitrators at least commensurate with other
international arbitral institutions.225
B. To What Extent Do Cultural Differences Effect Analysis
Western lawyers would be short sighted not to take into account
China's unique legal culture when trying to adapt CIETAC to give it a
greater appearance of neutrality. While similar experiences existed with
respect to the authoritarian governments in Iran and the Soviet Union, the
U.S. has different problems in China that in several aspects may make
222. See Cohen, supra note 116, 36.
223. CIETAC Fee Schedule available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/fee/fee.htm
(last visited Jan. 24, 2006). As of December 29, 2004 one U.S. Dollar equaled 8.27650
Chinese Yuan. Even with this exchange rate the amount of money involved in disputes
between U.S. and Chinese parties is sufficient to more than adequately compensate
CIETAC arbitrators.
224. "Whoever controls the volume of money in any country is absolute master of all
industry and commerce." U.S. President James A. Garfield (1831-1881) (during first
term as president). The quote is available at http://www.lansingbusiness
monthly.com/article read.asp?articlelD=3700 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
225. Due to varying factors, such as moving to China and quality of life, CIETAC
will probably have to compensate foreign arbitrators more than other international
arbitral institutions in order to attract the most qualified arbitrators.
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change easier.
In order to conduct successful dispute resolutions in China,
CIETAC must continue to implement its policy of conciliation.
226
Chinese nationals greatly value this process, and eliminating it would
hinder the ability of the institution to attract the support of the Chinese
government. However, CIETAC should alter its conciliation process to
avoid abuses by either the mediators or the parties.22 ' First, CIETAC
should set a time limit on the conciliation. In so doing, the parties would
know when they have to reach an agreement. Such a practice would help
to eliminate needless delay in the process and give both parties a realistic
time table for the finality of the dispute. Next, CIETAC should not allow
any of the arbitrators to act as mediators of the dispute. This practice
would facilitate the free flow of information between the parties and
eliminate any fear of possible bias that could form as a result of a failed
conciliation. An optimal structure for this process would include two
mediators, one Chinese and one western. In a perfect world, this process
would resolve a meaningful percentage of disputes before arbitration
proceedings commence. Furthermore, if successful, conciliation also
will allow Chinese parties to "save face '' 22 8 and thus make continued
business relations between the parties possible.
If western parties can overcome the barriers Chinese legal traditions
and practically implement as many of these legal traditions into the
dispute resolution process, western parties may find China more amiable
to change than either Iran or the Soviet Union. The U.S. has better
diplomatic relations with China than they had with Iran or the Soviet
Union.229 Moreover, China has a vested interest unlike that found in Iran
or the Soviet Union for U.S. investment in its economy in order to
modernize its economy.
Conversely, the U.S. diplomatically compelled Iran to establish the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to compensate U.S. parties for their losses
resulting from the 1979 Islamic revolution.230 As a result, Iran did not
226. See supra note 110.
227. See supra notes 70-84.
228. See Li, supra note 80, at 1060. See also White III, supra note 79, at 58.
229. Even during Gorbachev's reign as premier of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and
Soviet Union were still embattled in a Cold War. See Official Website of Mikael
Sereyevich Gorbachev, available at http://www.mikhailgorbachev.org/ (last visited Jan.
24, 2006). While currently China and the U.S. are not necessarily allies, they certainly
are not in the midst of a Cold War. Furthermore, with the increased trade between the
nations, they have become increasingly dependent economically on one another, which in
turn make diplomatic cooperation between the nations more important. See Andy Xie, Do
Imbalances Matter, Global Economic Forum: The Latest Views of Morgan Stanley
Economists available at http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/latest-
digest.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
230. After Iran seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the U.S. government froze all
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have the same economic interests in a successful claims tribunal as did
U.S. parties, especially during the early years of the tribunal, which no
doubt accounted for many of the problems and delays associated with the
tribunal. In addition, the U.S. and Iran had cut off diplomatic relations
throughout the period of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.231
The Soviet Union also did not have the same interests in the success
of arbitration with the U.S. as China currently does. Although
Gorbachev had implemented the policy of perestroika and increased
relations with the west, the Soviet Union never had the economic
relations with the U.S. that currently exists between China and the
United States.232 Lastly, the U.S. and China currently cooperate to
alleviate the threats of Islamic terrorists233 as well as Kim Jung-Il's
militaristic North Korean regime. 234 As a result, the U.S. government
may have more leverage to facilitate change in dispute resolution than it
ever wielded in Iran or the Soviet Union.
VI. Conclusion
With China's accession to the WTO in 2001, disputes between
Chinese and U.S. parties will only increase. The vast majority of these
disputes are handled through CIETAC. While CIETAC has improved its
Iranian assets. See supra note 5. This act prompted Iran to negotiate, leading directly to
the Algiers Accords and the formation of the claims tribunal. For more information on
the background of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, visit the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Official Website available at http://www.iusct.orgibackground-english.html (last visited
Jan. 24, 2006).
231. See Brower, supra note 138, at 421-22.
232. The NBA of all places provides a poignant example of this relationship. During
perestroika the Soviet Union had one of the most promising centers in the world, Arvytas
Sabonis. However, rather than allow him to compete in the National Basketball
Association with the best athletes in the world, the Soviet Union forced him to stay in the
Red Army. See e.g. Jack McCallum, SO NEAR, SO FAR; Three Soviet hockey and
basketball stars are hoping to play for U.S. pro teams, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 18,
1988, at 46. Approximately fifteen years later the same type of situation existed in China
with a young center named Yao Ming. Conversely though, China permitted Ming to play
in the NBA, where he currently stars for the Houston Rockets. See e.g. Brook Larmer,
OPERATION YAO MING: THE CHINESE SPORTS EMPIRE, AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS, AND THE
MAKING OF AN NBA SUPERSTAR (Gotham) (2005).
The relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union continuously improved
through the 1980s and may have developed the same type of relationship that China and
the U.S. currently have. However, an argument can be made that the reason the Soviet
Union did fall was because better relations with the west forced the country to focus on
its internal problems rather than the external enemy of the United States.
233. See e.g. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S.-CHINA COUNTER TERRORISM
COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
row/RS21995.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
234. See Tim Larimer, The Remaking of Kim Jun-ll, TIME MAGAZINE (June 26, 2000)
available at http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0, 10987,1101000626-
477 10,00.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
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appearance of impartiality over the past fifteen year, it still has glaring
flaws that have caused many western lawyers to question its
impartiality. 235 The risk involved in biased dispute resolution will cause
U.S. businesses to rethink their investment in the communist nation.
Such a chill in economic trade benefits neither China, the U.S., nor the
rest of the world. Thus, before such problems substantiate, the U.S. and
China need to improve the appearance of impartiality in the current
system.
Ultimately, the question of impartiality is one of appearance rather
than function. Even if CIETAC currently conducts neutral arbitrations,
the contrary belief of some western parties undermines its effectiveness.
Restructuring CIETAC, or a similar institution, to handle all international
disputes between China and western parties must appear fair for both
parties in order to ensure that the parties freely contract into it.
The experiences of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Institute can serve as a base upon
which CIETAC can build. The successes of these two forums in
arbitrating disputes between western and authoritarian governments
should act as a guide for workable solutions. Similarly, CIETAC should
serve notice to the problems experienced by FTAC in the Soviet Union
and the general reluctance of western parties to arbitrate in such a biased
forum.
Most importantly, CIETAC must improve the appearance of
neutrality of the presiding arbitrators. Such arbitrators should come from
neutral nations and have the highest disclosure requirements.
Conversely, party-appointed arbitrators may have a great deal more bias,
as allowed in certain U.S. jurisdictions.2 3 6  Allowing party-appointed
arbitrators to advocate for their appointing party's position will go a long
way towards reinsuring U.S. and Chinese parties that the tribunal hears
and understands their position. In order to practically implement these
policies, CIETAC needs to compensate foreign arbitrators on a level
commensurate with other international arbitral institutions. Not doing so
will give these arbitrators little incentive to become CIETAC arbitrators.
Such changes, as well as the others mentioned earlier, would make
CIETAC at least equally as legitimate a forum as other international
arbitral institutions. This legitimacy would result in more disputes
resolved through CIETAC, which in turn would promote more
investment in China by decreasing risk. With the endless economic
235. See THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE-CHINA, VIEWS OF AMERICAN
COMPANIES REGARDING ARBITRATION IN CHINA (May 2001), available at
http://www.AmCham-China.org.cn. (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). See also supra notes
113-131 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 32.
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potential in China, such investment would help to stimulate the world
economy.
In the end, the success of CIETAC depends upon the willingness of
the Chinese government to allow CIETAC to adopt such changes. The
current structure of CIETAC seems to balance the impartiality of the
process with the interests of the communist government. Regardless of
whether the Chinese government ever chooses to use such power, the
current system of CIETAC could allow China to fix or at the least
manipulate an arbitral result.237 Like a protective parent, the Chinese
government/Chamber of Commerce must loosen their protective reigns
in order for CIETAC to reach its full potential as an imporatial and
legitimate international arbitral institution, in order for CIETAC to reach
its full potential as an impartial and legitimate international arbitral
institution.
237. See supra note 115. If the Chinese government wanted to manipulate the
process, it could get two Chinese arbitrators appointed to the panel by having the Chinese
party, usually a government entity in the communist system, challenge the appointment
of the presiding arbitrator. Id. At this point the decision of the presiding arbitrators goes
to CIETAC Council who almost always appoints a Chinese arbitrator. Id. If the
government deemed the case important enough, the government could pressure CIETAC,
of which it at the least has indirect control, to appoint an arbitrator who will decide in
favor of the Chinese party. Id.
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